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Introduction
Parallel trade refers to the cross border resale of goods without the authorization of the manufacturer (Maskus, 2000) . This type of arbitrage is a response to international price di¤erences Department of Economics, University of Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073 Göttingen, Germany, laura.birg@wiwi.uni-goettingen.de. (Kyle, 2010) . In the European Union, parallel trade is a common phenomenon, especially for pharmaceuticals, where drug price di¤erences may reach up to 300% (Kanavos & Costa-Font, 2005 ).
One major source of drug price di¤erences are regulatory di¤erences, both in the level of regulation and the type of regulatory instruments applied. 1 Commonly applied regulatory instruments are price caps and reference prices. Price caps are intended to restrict monopoly pricing and reduce the prices (of covered drugs) directly by establishing price ceilings. 2 Reference prices are intended to increase price sensitivity by limiting reimbursement for a group of interchangeable drugs 3 by third-party payers. Under reference pricing, price setting is free, but the limitation of reimbursement implies that patients have to pay the di¤erence between the drug price and reimbursement limit. In the European Union, almost all member states use or have used price caps and/or reference prices (see Espin & Rovira (2007) or Carone, Schwierz & Xavier (2012) for an overview of regulatory interventions in the European Union).
By creating di¤erences in drug prices, regulatory di¤erences drive the direction and volume of parallel trade. 4 At the same time, parallel trade limits …rms' ability to set di¤erent prices in di¤erent countries. In destination countries of parallel imports, parallel trade may reduce drug prices by providing lower-priced substitutes and enhancing competition in pharmaceutical markets. 5 Price interdependencies under parallel trade may create the incentive for …rms to delay or avoid launches in low-price countries, i.e., potential source countries of parallel imports. This allows …rms to (temporarily) retain high prices in other countries (see Danzon, Wang & Wang, 2005; Kyle, 2007) . 6 For instance, there is an average launch delay of 10 months in the EU 1 According to 168 TFEU, health policy is in the national competence of member states. The Price Transparency Directive (Directive 89/195/EC), which provides rules for the control of pharmaceutical prices, is the only existing harmonization measure in the …eld of pharmaceutical price regulation and reimbursement. 2 Price caps may be based on prices of the same drug in other countries or prices of therapeutic alternatives. 3 Substitutability may be de…ned with respect to the active ingredient, therapeutic category or the therapeutic function (Lopez-Casanovas & Puig-Junoy, 2000). 4 Typical source countries of parallel imports are low price-countries with strict price regulation, e.g., Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, while destination countries are high price-countries with relatively free price setting, e.g., Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (Kanavos & Costa-Font, 2005) . In 2016, pharmaceutical parallel trade had a volume of e 5.2 bn (EFPIA, 2018). In the destination countries, the share of parallel imports in pharmacy market sales ranged between 8.2% in the Netherlands, 8 .5% in Germany, 12.9% in Sweden, and 25.5 % in Denmark (EFPIA, 2018). 5 Empirical evidence on the price decreasing e¤ect of parallel trade in destination countries is ambiguous. While some studies (Kanavos et al., 2004 , Kyle, Allsbrook & Schulman, 2008 …nd no evidence for price competition generated by parallel trade or stronger price competition than in countries without parallel trade, others (West & Mahon, 2003 , Ganslandt & Maskus, 2004 , Granlund & Köksal, 2011 , Duso, Herr & Suppliet, 2014 …nd that parallel trade may generate competitive pressure on drug prices. 6 Danzon et al. (2005) , Danzon & Epstein (2012) , Kyle (2011) suggest that stricter regulation and/or parallel trade may result in greater launch delays. Also, approval procedures for new drugs and approval times may 15 , ranging from 3.5 months in Germany to 18.9 months in Belgium (Heuer et al., 2007) . This suggests that pharmaceutical …rms' export decisions are determined by parallel trade and regulatory decisions (Bennato & Valletti, 2014) .
Given the risk that …rms may delay (or even limit supply) to low-price countries, governments in source countries of parallel imports may refrain form strict regulation if they take into account the impact of regulatory decisions on the …rm's decision to export to the respective country (Pecorino, 2002; Königbauer, 2004; Grossman & Lai, 2008; Bennato & Valletti, 2014) . Pecorino (2002) shows that under parallel trade, a pharmaceutical manufacturer will make fewer concessions in drug price bargaining in a potential source country of parallel imports. König-bauer (2004) argues that parallel imports may discipline national regulators in the European Union, as the manufacturer's threat of not supplying countries with low drug prices prevents free-riding on the pharmaceutical …rms' R&D investment by setting low prices. Similarly, Grossman & Lai (2008) show that the pace of innovation may be faster under parallel trade because of the change in regulatory choices under parallel trade. Bennato & Valletti (2014) …nd that a withdrawal from price regulation in a source country of parallel imports may increase R&D investment.
While the existing literature on the e¤ect of parallel trade on pharmaceutical regulation has focused so far on the impact of price caps in source countries of parallel imports, this paper extends the analysis of the e¤ect of parallel trade on pharmaceutical regulation to regulation in both the destination and the source country and to two potential regulatory instruments, price caps and reimbursement limits. This set-up allows di¤erentiating between the e¤ect of parallel trade on regulation in export-oriented destination countries and the e¤ect of parallel trade on regulation in import-oriented source countries. Moreover, the analysis of two common regulatory instruments allows studying the choice of instruments.
The e¤ect of parallel trade on regulation is linked to the policy issue of access to pharmaceuticals. Parallel trade may a¤ect access in the source country of parallel imports if manufacturers decide to limit or avoid selling in low-price countries. Moreover, also through its impact on regulatory decisions parallel trade may a¤ect access -if governments change regulatory decisions in response to parallel trade, this also changes drug prices and with it access.
By changing regulatory decisions in destination and/or source country of parallel imports, parallel trade may result in regulatory convergence or regulatory divergence. In the former contribute to non-launches (Houy & Jelovac, 2018) .
case, parallel trade may also erode price di¤erences between countries, in particular, if price di¤erences are regulation driven. In this sense, market integration through parallel trade may replace policy harmonization. Given that virtually no harmonization instrument is in place in the European Union, parallel trade may be of particular importance.
In the source country (hereafter South), parallel trade may relax regulation under both regulatory instruments but not always: Under price caps, it decreases the level of regulation unless also the destination country sets a price cap. Under reimbursement limits, it does so if both countries are su¢ciently di¤erent concerning demand and if the destination country does not set a price cap. The manufacturer's threat of not supplying the source country of parallel imports requires a pro…table alternative, i.e., the loss in pro…t from not selling in the source country has to be compensated by selling at a higher price in the destination country.
In the destination country (North), parallel trade may intensify regulation but only under reimbursement limits. Under price caps, the destination country prefers a high level of regulation, i.e., a price cap of zero, as it increases consumer surplus and decreases third-party payer expenditure. Under reimbursement limits, the destination country prefers a low level of regulation, i.e., reimbursement of the full drug price, as a decrease in the reimbursement limit would decrease third-party payer expenditure, but also consumer surplus. 7 In response to the increase in third-party payer expenditure due to the lower drug price under parallel trade, the government in the destination country decreases the reimbursement limit.
Parallel trade may change the choice of regulatory instruments: Under no parallel trade, both the North and the South prefer price caps over reimbursement limits. Welfare in both countries decreases in the drug price. Price caps allow governments to set a drug price of zero, while free pricing under reimbursement limits yields a higher drug price. Under parallel trade, the North applies a reimbursement limit, but the South sets a price cap. Choosing a reimbursement limit allows the North to enforce a lower level of regulation and thus a higher price in the South. The North accepts a higher drug price and thus lower consumer surplus and higher third-party payer reimbursement at the bene…t of boosting the …rm's pro…t. The reimbursement limit in the North allows enforcing a higher drug price in the South than under price caps. The South, as under no parallel trade, prefers a price caps to the reimbursement limit, as it allows attaining a lower drug price. This is, under endogenous health policy choice, parallel trade results in a lower level of regulation and higher drug prices. Compared to the 7 Under both instruments, a high level or regulation decreases the …rm's pro…t. equilibrium without parallel trade, in which both countries set price caps of zero, drug prices under parallel trade are higher. This also worsens access in both the source and destination country.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section 3 studies the e¤ect of regulation on the export decision. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ect of parallel trade on the level of regulation for a given instrument. Section 5 studies the e¤ect of parallel trade on the choice of regulatory instruments. Section 6 presents discussions of the model. Section 7 concludes.
Model
Consider two countries j = N; S, North and South, which di¤er in demand. 8 In the North, an innovative …rm is located which sells an on-patent drug. The …rm may decide not to sell to the South. In both countries, welfare-maximizing governments may limit prices directly via price caps or restrict third-party payer reimbursement for the drug via reimbursement limits.
Firm
In the North, there is an innovative …rm F which sells an on-patent drug. The …rm always sells in the North (if the price is non-negative), but the …rm may decide whether or not to sell the South. Patent protection provides the …rm with a monopoly status in both countries. The …rm produces at constant marginal cost, which is normalized to zero.
Depending on whether parallel trade takes place or not, two pricing regimes are possible:
If parallel trade does not take place, the …rm may price discriminate between the North and the South and set country-speci…c drug prices p j . If parallel trade takes place, the …rm sets a uniform price, as parallel trade undermines the ability to price discriminate. Therefore, parallel trade (as costless arbitrage) enforces a uniform (drug) price in both countries (as in Pecorino, Under parallel trade, the …rm may avoid selling at the uniform price in both countries, if it does not export to the South. Then the …rm foregoes sales in the South but may set a country-speci…c price in the North. This is, under parallel trade faces the trade-o¤ between selling in both countries at a uniform price or selling at a country-speci…c price in the North 8 Countries di¤er in both the maximum willingness to pay and price elasticity. and foregoing sales in the South.
Consumers
In both countries, there is a unit mass of consumers di¤ering in willingness to pay for the drug.
Each consumer demands either one or zero units of the drug. This implies that the market is not covered and changes in the drug price result in changes in quantities. The utility derived from no drug consumption is zero. A consumer i in country j who buys one unit of drug obtains a net utility of
where ij is the gross valuation of consumers and c j country-speci…c drug copayment. The (preference) parameter can be interpreted as willingness to pay. Assume that the parameter is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; j ] in country j = N; S, where N = S = 1.
Heterogeneity among consumers in may stem from, for instance, di¤erences in the severity of the condition, prescription practices or insurance coverage (see e.g., Brekke, Holmas & Straume, 2011). The parameter j can be interpreted as the maximum willingness to pay. In the following, will be referred to as demand parameter.
The marginal consumer in country j who is indi¤erent between buying the drug or not has a gross valuation ij = c j . Hence, demand in country N is given as q N = 1 ( c N ), and demand in country S is given as q S = 1 c S .
Governments
In both countries, third-party payers (health insurance, health insurance programs or social insurance, etc.) cover drug costs partially. The copayment is price dependent: Consider that consumers pay a fraction j , j 2 (0; 1), out-of-pocket (coinsurance) 9 . Under coinsurance, the drug copayment (and thus, the relevant price for consumers) is c j = j p j , the reimbursement by third-party payers is 1 j p j .
In both countries, governments may limit prices directly via price caps or restrict third-party payer reimbursement for the drug via reimbursement limits. Under price caps, governments restrict drug prices to maximum prices P j that may be charged by …rms. Under reimbursement 9 Typically, coinsurance rates are not subject to frequent changes. Coinsurance rates are set to balance the protection from risks of …nancially losses due to sickness and (prevention of) moral hazard in utilizing health care products and services. In Germany, e.g., the coinsurance rate has not been changed since 2004. limits, governments restrict reimbursement by third-party payers to reimbursement limits r j .
Firms are free to set prices, but third-party payers reimburse the drug based on the reimbursement limit, which changes consumer copayments to c R j = j r j + p j r j and reimbursement to
Governments maximize domestic welfare, which is de…ned as the (unweighted) sum of consumer surplus and the …rm's pro…t net of third-party payer reimbursement in the North and consumer surplus net of third-party payer reimbursement in the South:
Consumer surplus in country j is de…ned as
given as = q N p N + q S p S , third-party payer reimbursement in country j is de…ned as E j =
(1 j )p j q j under no regulation and price caps 10 and E j = (1 j )p j q j under reimbursement limits. 11 
Structure of the Model
In this set-up, there are two (major) di¤erences between the two countries: First, countries N and S di¤er in demand and demand elasticity (due to di¤erences in maximum willingness to pay and coinsurance rates). Di¤erences in j and/or j generate di¤erences in drug prices, triggering parallel trade. Second, as the North is export-oriented, while the South is importoriented, welfare, government objectives, and regulatory decisions may di¤er between the two countries.
Consider the following timing: In stage 0, governments in the North and the South choose the regulatory instrument. In stage 1, the …rm decides whether or not to sell to the South. In stage 3, governments set price caps or reimbursement limits. In the latter case, the …rm sets prices in stage 4.
1 0 Under no regulation and price caps, the third-party payer reimburses the drug based on the drug price. 1 1 Under reimbursement limits, the third-party payer reimburses the drug based on the reimbursement limit.
The E¤ect of Parallel Trade on the Export Decision
Before I study the e¤ect of parallel trade on regulation, I explore the e¤ect of parallel trade on the …rm's export decision without regulation in this section, as this is the basis for the …rm's threat of non-supply.
Equilibrium prices, quantities, and the …rm's pro…t can be found in Appendix A.1. The superscript x denotes variables under no parallel trade.
No Parallel Trade
When parallel trade is not allowed, the …rm can price-discriminate. The …rm maximizes
The …rm price sets equilibrium country-speci…c prices
Drug prices decrease in coinsurance rates j , which translate to price elasticities. Also, the drug price in the North increases in the maximum willingness to pay .
Drug price di¤erences stem from di¤erences in coinsurance rates and/or di¤erences in demand. In particular, the price in the North is higher than the price in the South, if demand in the North is su¢ciently high, > f x = N S , and/or if the coinsurance rate (and accordingly price elasticity) in the North is su¢ciently low relative to that in the South, N < f x N = S . 12 This implies that both di¤erences in demand and di¤erences in coinsurance rates are drivers for parallel trade. 13 In this case, parallel trade would be pro…table. In what follows, assume N < f x N = S , i.e., parallel trade takes place.
Parallel Trade
If parallel trade is allowed, the possibility to price discriminate is undermined, and the …rm sells at a uniform price p N S in both countries. The …rm's pro…t is p N S > p x S ). 14 Higher demand , i.e. greater di¤erences between countries, aggravates the price changes generated by parallel trade (
Under parallel trade, the …rm may decide not to sell to the South to avoid selling at a uniform price. The …rm sells to both countries if = N;S x N 0, i.e., the pro…t from selling both countries at a uniform price p N S is at least as high as the pro…t from selling to only the North at the country-speci…c price p x N . The …rm trades o¤ accepting a lower price in the North and selling in both countries and setting a country-speci…c price for the North and foregoing sales in the South. The …rm sells to the South if demand in the North is su¢ciently low ( < c ). In this case, the additional pro…t from selling in the South exceeds the pro…t lost due to selling at a lower uniform price in the North.
Parallel trade determines the pricing regime, i.e., whether price discrimination is possible or whether the …rm sets a uniform price. Thus, parallel trade also has an impact on the …rm's decision whether to sell to the South.
Parallel trade only occurs within a limited range of parameters. Two conditions have to be met: The …rst condition is that a su¢cient price di¤erence between N and S makes parallel trade pro…table. The second condition is that the drug has to be sold to the South in the …rst place. By not supplying the South, the …rm can deter parallel trade.
Welfare
Welfare in the North is given as W x N = CS x N + E x N , welfare in the South is given as
In the North, parallel trade decreases the drug price. The lower drug price increases consumer surplus and decreases third-party payer expenditure. The …rm's pro…t decreases, as parallel trade generates distortions from the pro…t-maximizing prices in both countries, i.e., both the pro…t from sales to the North and the pro…t from sales to the South are lower under parallel trade. If demand in the North is su¢ciently low, and prices in both countries under no parallel trade are rather similar, the latter e¤ect is less strong. Therefore, parallel trade increases welfare in the North if demand is su¢ciently low, i.e.W N W x N > 0 if < ] W N . In the South, parallel trade increases the drug price. The higher drug price decreases consumer surplus but decreases third-party payer expenditure (the quantity e¤ect is stronger than the price e¤ect). Higher demand in the North increases the uniform price under parallel trade, and the latter e¤ect is stronger. Thus, parallel trade increases welfare in the South if demand in the North is su¢ciently high, i.e.,
4 Choice of Regulation Level -Second-stage Outcome
In this section, I study the e¤ect of parallel trade on the level of regulation for given regulatory instruments. The regulatory instrument is treated as exogenous in this section, but it will be endogenized in section 5. I denote no regulation by ?, a price cap by the superscript P , a reimbursement limit by the superscript R; and policy choice by = f?; P; Rg. Superscripts N , S denote equilibrium policy choices in the North and South. There are two symmetric equilibria (P P; RR) and two asymmetric equilibria (P R; RP ). In addition, there are two equilibria, in which only the South regulates prices or reimbursement (?R, ?P ). In what follows, I will discuss the symmetric equilibria as well as the equilibria in which only the South regulates …rst, followed by asymmetric equilibria.
Under no parallel trade, policy choices in both countries are independent, under parallel trade, policy choices are linked via the uniform drug price. Consider …rst that parallel trade is not allowed. As drug prices and/or policy choices are independent, the equilibria in which i) only the government in the South (x; ?P ) sets a price cap P
Price Caps in
x;?P S and in which ii) both governments in the North and in the South set price caps P
x;P N , P x;P S (x; P P ), are discussed jointly.
The …rm's pro…t is given as
For equilibrium ?P , the …rm may set the drug price freely in the North, while in the South the government sets a price cap P x;?P S . The …rm sets the drug price p
In country S, welfare decreases in the price cap. The government in the South sets P
x;?P S = 0.
For equilibrium P P , governments in the North and the South set price caps P x;P P N , P
x;P P S .
In both countries, welfare decreases in the price cap. In the North, a lower price cap increases demand, increasing consumer surplus and decreasing third-party payer expenditure. At the same time, lower price caps in both countries decrease the …rm's pro…t. The former e¤ect dominates the latter and welfare decreases in the drug price. In the South, welfare unambiguously decreases in the price cap; a lower price cap increases consumer surplus and decreases third-party payer expenditure.
The government in the North sets P x;P P N = 0, the government in the South sets P
x;P P S = 0.
Price caps of zero imply that neither consumers nor health insurance have to pay for the drug and the market is covered.
Lemma 1 summarizes regulatory preferences in North and South for price caps.
Lemma 1 Under price caps, both North and South prefer a high level of regulation, i.e., price caps of zero.
Parallel Trade and Price Cap in the South (?P )
Consider that parallel trade is allowed and only the South sets a price cap P P S . The …rm's pro…t is given as
In this case, the price in the North is neither determined by the …rm nor the government in the North but is given by the price cap in the South: The government in the South sets the global price.
Under parallel trade, the …rm may avoid selling at a uniform price (or the price cap set by the government in the South) by not selling to the South. The …rm sells to the South under parallel trade if the pro…t from selling at the price cap P P S in both markets is at least as high than selling at the (free) price p x N in the North only, i.e., ?P =
cap aggravates the trade-o¤ associated with the export decision: The lower the price cap, the higher is the di¤erence in pro…ts for the …rm's two strategies and the less likely it is that the …rm sells to the South. Note that for a price cap of zero (as it is under no parallel trade), the …rm abstains from exporting to the South. Only if P ?P S > [ P ?P S , i.e., the price cap is su¢ciently high, the …rm sells to the South.
Welfare in the South decreases in the price cap P 
Parallel Trade and Price Caps in the North and South (P P )
Consider that parallel trade is allowed and both countries set price caps. In this case, the lower price cap becomes the global price cap. This is, de facto only one government decides on the price cap in both countries. Parallel trade constrains regulatory decisions in the sense that the price cap has to be not only lower than the …rm's price but also lower than the price cap in the other country to be binding.
If P P P N P P P S , the price cap in the North is P P P N , the price cap in the South is P P P S . In this case, the higher price cap does not spill over to the North. If P P P N > P P P S , the price cap in the South is the global price cap. In the former case, if P P P N P P P S , P P P P T;P P =P P T;P P N = P T;P N;S P;(:) N > 0, i.e., the …rm sells to the South at any price cap P P P S , as selling in the South does not imply accepting a lower price for sales also in the North. Also, in this case, the government in the North sets a lower price than the government in the South, and parallel trade does not take place so that a potentially lower price from the South cannot spill over to the South. In the latter case, if P P P N > P P P S , the price cap in the South is the global price cap. The …rm sells in the South, if the pro…t from selling at the price cap P P S in both markets is at least as high than selling at the (free) price p x N in the North only, i.e., P P
that is, if P P P S > \ P P P S; P P , i.e., the price cap is su¢ciently high. As before, welfare in both countries decreases in the price cap. Lower price caps increase consumer surplus, decrease third-party payer expenditure and decrease the …rm's pro…t, overall increasing welfare in both countries. Governments set price caps P P P N = 0, P P P S = 0. Under these equilibrium price caps, the …rm sells to the South as sales to the South do not come at the cost of accepting a lower price for sales in the North as well. The price cap in the North if the …rm decided not to export to the South would be P xP P N = 0, this is, it would be thus the same.
The preference in the North for a low price cap allows the South to opt for a strict price cap as well because the …rm cannot credibly threaten not to supply the South (if a low price in the South does not spill over to the North under parallel trade). The preference of the North for a low price cap deprives the …rm of its threat of non-supply to the South, and thus the …rm cannot use this threat to press for a higher price cap in the South. If both countries set price caps, parallel trade does not induce a lower level of regulation in either country. The North's preference for a low price cap allows the South to also choose a low price cap without being constrained by the …rm's threat of not exporting to the South. 
Reimbursement Limits in Both Countries (RR) or the South only (?R)
Consider now a scenario, in which both governments or only the government in the South set reimbursement limits. This implies that governments do not regulate prices directly but thirdparty payer reimbursement. The regulation of reimbursement separates the copayment paid by the consumer, the amount …nanced by the third-party payer, and the price received by the …rm.
Governments restrict reimbursement to r j p R j in country j. The …rm is free in setting prices. Consider that governments set reimbursement limits to maximize welfare and can commit to reimbursement limits. In the …rst stage, governments set reimbursement limits; in the second stage, the …rm decides whether to export and in the third stage the …rm sets prices. Reimbursement limits and welfare can be found in Appendix A.3.
No Parallel Trade (x; ?R; x; RR)
Consider …rst that parallel trade is not allowed. As drug prices and/or policy choices are independent, the equilibria in which i) only the government in the South (x; ?R) sets reimbursement limit r
x;R S and in which ii) both governments in the North and the South set reimbursement limit r 
For equilibrium ?R, the …rm sets drug prices p . 16 In the South, welfare decreases in the reimbursement limit, the government in the South sets r x;?R S = 0.
For the equilibrium RR, the …rm sets drug prices
. 17 In the North, welfare increases in the reimbursement limit. A (potential) decrease in the reimbursement limit would increase the consumer copayment for a given drug price 18 and would decrease the quantity demanded. This would decrease consumer surplus, the …rm's pro…t, and decrease third-party payer expenditure, with an overall negative e¤ect on welfare. Therefore, the government sets the highest possible binding reimbursement limit, r . 1 8 The drug price increases in the reimbursement limit. A decrease in the reimbursement limit decreases the drug price, but the decrease in the drug price does not fully compensate the decrease in the reimbursement limit and the consumer copayment increases.
In the South, welfare decreases in the reimbursement limit. A (potential) decrease in the reimbursement limit would increase the consumer copayment for a given drug price and would decrease the quantity demanded, decreasing consumer surplus and decreasing third-party payer expenditure. The overall e¤ect of a (potential) decrease in the reimbursement limit on welfare would be positive. Therefore, the government in the South sets r Lemma 2 Under reimbursement limits, the North prefers a low level of regulation, i.e., reimbursement of the drug price, and the South prefer a high level of regulation, i.e., a reimbursement limit of zero.
Parallel Trade and Reimbursement Limit in the South (?R)
Consider now that parallel trade is allowed and only the South sets a reimbursement limit r ?R S . The …rm sells at a uniform price p R N S in both countries. The …rm's pro…t is
The …rm sets the uniform price p
. 19 The drug price increases in the reimbursement limits. The …rm exports to the South under parallel trade if the pro…t from selling to both countries at a uniform price is at least as high as the pro…t from selling to only the North at a country-speci…c price (and not selling to the South), i.e. Compared to price caps, the potential of parallel trade to prevent a high level of regulation under reimbursement limits is lower. Price caps enforce maximum prices set by the government.
Free pricing under reimbursement limits implies that the …rm may avoid a very low drug price even for a high level of regulation, but the …rm loses the threat of non-supply at the same time.
Parallel Trade and Reimbursement Limits in the North and South (RR)
Consider now that parallel trade is allowed and both governments set reimbursement limits r RR N and r RR S . The …rm's pro…t is
The …rm sets the uniform price
. 20 The drug price increases in both reimbursement limits. The …rm exports to the South under parallel trade if the pro…t from While under both price caps and reimbursement limits, parallel trade may relax regulation, market outcomes under the two instruments di¤er: Under reimbursement limits, more relaxed regulation implies higher reimbursement limits and lower copayments (i.e., a shift of the …nancing burden from the patient to the insurer); whereas under price caps, more relaxed regulation results in higher price caps, that is, higher copayments and higher reimbursement (i.e., an increase in the transfer from patient and insurer to the …rm). 
Under no parallel trade, pricing and regulatory decisions are independent. Therefore, the price for the North is the same as in the equilibrium ?P or P P , the price for the South is the same as in the equilibrium ?R or RR. In the North, the government sets P Consider now that parallel trade is allowed and the government in the North sets a price cap P P R N and the government in the South sets a reimbursement limit r P R S . The …rm's pro…t is given as
The price cap in the North is P P R N , the (freely set) drug price in the South is p P R S . In this case, the price cap in the North is lower than the drug price in the South and parallel trade does not occur. If P P R N > p P R S , the price cap in the North would not be binding and the drug price in the South is the global price.
In the South, the …rm sets the drug price p P R S =
. The …rm always sells to the South, i.e., P R = P R N;S xP N > 0. Selling in the South does not imply accepting a lower price for sales also in the North, as parallel trade does not take place. In the North, welfare decreases in the price cap and therefore the government sets a price cap of P P R N = 0. In the South, welfare decreases in the reimbursement limit and thus the government sets r P R;P S = 0.
Parallel trade does not a¤ect regulatory decisions in both countries. 
Under no parallel trade, pricing and regulatory decisions are independent. Therefore, the price for the North is the same as in the equilibrium ?R or RR; the price for the South is the same as in the equilibrium ?P or P P . In the North, the …rm sets the drug price 2 2 Binding reimbursement limits imply rS f rS =
. 23 and the government in the South sets r xRP N = f r N . In the South, the …rm sets the price P x;P R S = 0.
Parallel Trade and Reimbursement Limit in the North, Price Cap in the South (RP )
Consider that parallel trade is allowed and the government in the North sets a reimbursement limit r RP N and the government in the South sets a price cap P RP S . The …rm's pro…t is given as
The price cap in the South is the global price cap. This implies that the drug price in the North is P RP S . 24 The …rm sells to the South if the pro…t from selling to both countries at a uniform price is at least as high as the pro…t from selling to only the North at the drug price p RP N (and not selling to the South), i.e., RP = RP N;S xP N 0. In the North, welfare increases in the reimbursement limit. A (potential) decrease in the reimbursement limit would increase the consumer copayment for a given drug price and would decrease the quantity demanded. This would decrease consumer surplus, the …rm's pro…t, and decrease third-party payer expenditure, with an overall negative e¤ect on welfare. Therefore, the government sets the highest possible binding reimbursement limit, r 
Choice of Regulatory Instrument -First-stage Outcome
Consider now the choice of regulatory instruments in both countries.
No Parallel Trade
Under no parallel trade, the choice of the regulatory instrument in both countries is independent.
The choice of the regulatory instrument in the South a¤ects welfare in the North via the …rm's pro…t, but there is no strategic e¤ect of the North's choice of policy instrument on the policy choice in the South or vice versa. In the South, welfare is the same, irrespective of the instrument chosen by the North.
Both countries prefer price caps over reimbursement limits. In both countries, welfare decreases in the drug price. Price caps allow governments to set a drug price of zero, whereas reimbursement limits with the associated free pricing always generate a higher drug price. In addition, under price caps, governments may increase consumer surplus and decrease third-party payer expenditure at the same time. Under reimbursement limits, however, there is a trade-o¤ between increasing consumer surplus and decreasing expenditure: A decrease in the reimbursement limit increases the copayment, thus decreasing third-party payer expenditure, but also decreasing consumer surplus.
Parallel Trade
Under parallel trade, the choices of the regulatory instrument are linked via the price. If the South sets a price cap, the (lower) price cap translates directly to the drug price in the North.
If the South sets a reimbursement limit, the uniform price under parallel trade increases in the reimbursement limit in the South.
The North chooses a price cap if the South set a reimbursement limit and the North chooses a reimbursement limit if the South set a price cap. If the South sets a reimbursement limit, the North chooses a price cap, as it generates a lower drug price and thus higher welfare in the North.
Compared to the equilibrium in which both countries choose reimbursement limits, welfare in the North is higher as the drug price is lower, consumer surplus is higher, and third-party payer expenditure is lower. If the South sets a price cap, the North sets a reimbursement limit to enforce a higher price cap in the South. The North accepts a higher drug price and thus lower consumer surplus and higher third-party payer reimbursement at the bene…t of boosting the …rm's pro…t. Compared to the equilibrium in which both countries choose price caps, welfare in the North is higher as the …rm's pro…t is higher as the drug price in the South is higher, although consumer surplus is lower and third-party payer expenditure is higher.
The South always prefers price caps over reimbursement limits, irrespective of the policy choice in the North. Welfare decreases in the drug price and price caps allow the government in the South to achieve a lower drug price as compared to a reimbursement limit.
In the resulting equilibrium, the North sets a reimbursement limit, while the South sets a price cap. In this equilibrium, the South sets a price cap higher than zero that is compatible with the …rm exporting to the South. This price cap also applies in the North, where the government sets a reimbursement limit equal to the price cap.
Parallel trade diversi…es regulation in the sense that it results in di¤erent instruments being applied in the two countries. Compared to the equilibrium under no parallel trade, where both countries set price caps of zero, parallel trade relaxes regulation. This suggests that the potential of parallel trade to relax regulation also holds under endogenous health policy choice.
Proposition 2 summarizes the choice of regulatory instruments.
Proposition 4 Under no parallel trade, both the North and the South choose price caps in equilibrium. Under parallel trade, the North chooses a reimbursement limit, and the South chooses a price cap in equilibrium.
Discussion

Governments Objectives
Governments might give more weight to minimizing third-party payer expenditure than maximizing welfare. The South would have a similar preference for strict regulation under both instruments, as a low price cap and a low reimbursement limit decrease third-party payer expenditure. The North, however, would prefer a low price cap but would also choose a low reimbursement limit if minimizing third-party payer expenditure was more important. In this case, the e¤ect of parallel trade on regulation under reimbursement limits would be similar than the e¤ect under price caps, a preference for a high level of regulation in the North would eliminate the …rm's threat of non-supply to the South. This allows the South to pursue strict regulation without risking the non-supply.
Regulatory preferences in the North would also change if the …rm were a multinational enterprise or if the government did not take the …rm's pro…t into account. In this case, the North would only care about consumer surplus and third-party payer expenditure, just as the South. Under a reimbursement limit, the North would then prefer a high level of regulation, i.e., a reimbursement limit of zero. Then the case of reimbursement limits in both countries would be similar to the case of price caps, and parallel trade had no e¤ect on the level of regulation in both countries. Under endogenous regulatory instrument choice, the North would then choose a price cap (of zero), parallel trade did not a¤ect the choice of regulatory instruments in both countries.
Cooperative Governments
Governments might also cooperate in choosing the level of regulation or setting regulatory instruments. Under price caps, both countries choose a price cap of zero, but a higher price cap in the South would increase welfare in the North (via the …rm's pro…t). Under cooperation (and a potential side payment) the South could potentially be motivated to increase its price cap, thereby reducing consumer surplus and increasing third-party payer expenditure, while welfare in the North would increase due to an increase in the …rm's pro…t. Under reimbursement limits, cooperation would relax regulation in both countries. This would increase the drug price and reduce the quantity demanded, thereby reducing consumer surplus, reducing third-party payer expenditure, and increasing the …rm's pro…t.
Incomplete Spillovers From Parallel Trade
The model assumes that pricing interdependence under parallel trade induces the manufacturer to set a uniform price under parallel trade. This assumption can also be found in Pecorino associate a lower quality with the parallel import due to di¤erences in appearance and packaging (Maskus, 2000) or because manufacturers try to restrict parallel trade by di¤erentiating products across countries (Kyle, 2011) . In this case, only a part of the market in the North would be a¤ected by parallel trade and the …rm could set a di¤erent (and higher) price for the part of the market that is isolated from parallel trade. Results from the model would qualitatively be similar but weaker. For example, for a signi…cant di¤erence in demand between the North and the South, it would be optimal for the …rm to sell to the North only and not export to the South in order to retain a high price in the North and to avoid the spillover of the lower price in the South to part of the market in the North.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have studied the e¤ect of parallel trade on pharmaceutical regulation in a NorthSouth framework. An innovative …rm located in the North can sell its drug only in the North or in both countries. Governments may set price caps or may limit reimbursement for the drug.
Parallel trade may relax regulation in the source country under both regulatory instruments: Under price caps, it only decreases the level of regulation if the destination country does not set a price cap. Under reimbursement limits, it only does so if both countries are su¢ciently di¤erent with respect to demand and if the destination country does not set a price cap. The manufacturer's threat of not supplying the source country of parallel imports requires a pro…table alternative, i.e., the loss in pro…t from not selling in the source country has to be compensated by selling at a higher price in the destination country.
Parallel trade may intensify regulation in the destination country but only under reimbursement limits. Under price caps, the destination country prefers a high level of regulation, i.e., a price cap of zero, as it increases consumer surplus and decreases third-party payer expenditure. Under reimbursement limits, the destination country prefers a low level of regulation, i.e., reimbursement of the full drug price, as a decrease in the reimbursement limit would decrease third-party payer expenditure, but also consumer surplus. 25 In response to the increase in third-party payer expenditure due to the lower drug price under parallel trade, the government in the destination country decreases the reimbursement limit. By relaxing regulation in the source country and/or intensifying regulation in the destination country, parallel trade results in regulatory convergence. This implies, that for given regulatory instruments, parallel trade may be a substitute for policy harmonization in some cases, e.g., if both countries set reimbursement limits, but not in others, e.g., if both countries set price caps. Whether parallel trade may replace policy harmonization depends on whether the …rm has a pro…table outside option when not selling in the South, i.e., the regulatory choice in the destination country or on di¤erences in demand between countries.
Parallel trade may change regulatory preferences: Under no parallel trade, both the North and the South prefer price caps over reimbursement limits. Welfare in both countries decreases in the drug price. Price caps allow governments to set a drug price of zero, while free pricing under reimbursement limits yields a higher drug price. Under parallel trade, the South sets a price cap, as it allows attaining a lower drug price. The North applies a reimbursement limit, as it allows the North to enforce a higher price cap in the South. The North accepts a higher drug price and thus lower consumer surplus and higher third-party payer reimbursement at the bene…t of boosting the …rm's pro…t. The reimbursement limit in the North allows enforcing a higher drug price in the South than under price caps. This result complements the result in the previous literature on the e¤ect of parallel trade on regulation, namely that governments in source countries may refrain form strict regulation if they take into account the impact of regulatory decisions on the …rm's decision to supply the respective country. For endogenous health policy choice, both source and destination countries of parallel imports choose less strict regulation with higher drug prices. This result also implies that the ability of parallel trade to replace policy harmonization is no longer dependent on di¤erences in demand between countries.
Moreover, this e¤ect seems not to be brought about by the …rm's pro…t maximization but is also in the interest of the welfare-maximizing government in the destination country.
Under Under no parallel trade, the …rm's pro…t is
; the equilibrium price in S is p
. The price in N is higher than the price in S if is su¢ciently high or N is su¢ciently low
Parallel Trade
Under parallel trade, the …rm's pro…t is N;S = 1 ( N pNS) pNS + (1 S pNS) pNS. The equilibrium uniform price is pNS = N + S . Compared to the prices under no parallel trade, the uniform price under parallel is lower than the price in N if is su¢ciently high (pNS pN =
> c p ) and the uniform price under parallel is higher than the price in S if is su¢ciently high
The …rm exports to S if is su¢ciently low or N is su¢ciently high (
. Compared to welfare under no parallel trade, welfare in N is higher under parallel trade, if is su¢ciently low
) and welfare in S is higher under parallel trade if is su¢ciently high (WS W
A.2 Choice of Regulation Level -Second-stage Outcome
Price Caps in Both Countries (P P ) or the South only (?P )
No Parallel Trade (?P; P P ) Under no parallel trade and a price cap the South only (?P ), the …rm's pro…t is + P
x;?P S
Under no parallel trade and price caps in both countries (P P ), the …rm's pro…t is x;P P N;S = qN P x;P P N P x;P P N + qS P
x;P P S P x;P P S . Welfare in N is
The welfare maximizing price cap in N is P x;P P N = 0.
In both cases, welfare in S is
The welfare maximizing price cap in S is P x;(:)P S = 0.
In the equilibrium with a price cap in the South only (?P ), welfare in N is W . In the equilibrium with price caps in both countries (P P ), welfare in N is W 
Parallel Trade and Price Cap in the South (?P )
Under parallel trade and a price cap in the South only, the …rm's pro…t is
S . The …rm exports to S if the price cap P ?P S is su¢ciently high
. Welfare in S is
For a price cap of zero, the …rm does not export to S (
For the welfare-maximizing price cap in the South, welfare in N is
Compared to parallel trade and no regulation, welfare in N is higher if is su¤ciently high
is the solution to
Parallel Trade and Price Cap in the North and South (P P )
Under parallel trade and price caps in both countries (P P ), the …rm's pro…t is P P N;S = 8 > < > :
S , the …rm always exports to S (
S , the …rm exports to S if the price cap P P T;P P S is su¤ciently high
). Under a price cap P xP P N of zero, the …rm exports to the South (P xP P N = 0 ! \ P P P S; P P P xP P N = 0).
The welfare maximizing price cap in N is P
The welfare maximizing price cap in S is P P P S = 0.
For welfare-maximizing price caps, welfare in N is W P P N P P P N ; P
; welfare in S is
Compared to parallel trade and no regulation, welfare in N is lower (
Reimbursement Limits in Both Countries
The welfare-maximizing reimbursement limit in N is r 
). Welfare in S is higher under a reimbursement limit in the South (?R) and under reimbursement limits in both countries (RR) (W 
Parallel Trade and Reimbursement Limit in S (?R)
Under parallel trade and a reimbursement limit in the South only (?R), the …rm's pro…t is (1 S )(4+r
).
Welfare in N is
Consider two cases: i) For < g ?R = 3 N , the welfare-maximizing reimbursement limit in S is r . ii) For > g ?R , the welfare-
, which higher than under no parallel
Compared to parallel trade and no regulation, i) welfare in N is lower for
< 0) and ii) welfare in N is lower for > g ?R and if is a su¢ciently
Parallel Trade and Reimbursement Limits in N and S (RR)
Under parallel trade and reimbursement limits in both countries, the …rm's pro…t is
. The equilibrium pro…t is
( +1)
.
The …rm exports to S if is su¢ciently low or r RR S is su¢ciently high
). For r 
Best response functions are r
Consider two cases: i) For < g RR , the welfare-maximizing reimbursement limit in N is
and the welfare-maximizing reimbursement limit in S is r RR S < g RR = 0. ii) For > g RR , the welfare-maximizing reimbursement limit in N is r
and the welfare-maximizing reimbursement limit in S is r
g RR is the solution to
Compared to no parallel trade and reimbursement limits in both countries, the reimbursement limit in N is
< 0). The reimbursement limit in S is the same for < g RR and higher for > g RR ( r
Compared to parallel trade and no regulation, welfare in N is lower for . Welfare in N is W
The welfare maximizing price cap in N is P x;P R N = 0.
Welfare in S is W x;P R S = 1 + r
The welfare maximizing rembursement limit in S is r ).
For r 
